4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships

submitted by Professor Huzzaz on 07/17/13 1

Game Theory (ECON 159) We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium. 00:00 - Chapter 1. Best Response: Penalty Kicks in Soccer 15:14 - Chapter 2. Best Response: Issues with the Penalty Kick Model 24:06 - Chapter 3. Best Response: Formal Definition 29:59 - Chapter 4. Externalities and Inefficient Outcomes: The Partnership Game 01:07:23 - Chapter 5. Nash Equilibrium: Preview Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: open.yale.edu/courses This course was recorded in Fall 2007.

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